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such allocative inefficiency effects. We also find that restructurings by bank-financed bidders
are relatively risky as they have greater bankruptcy refiling rates, irrespective of the coalition’s
overbidding incentive.
1 Introduction
In Sweden, a firm filing for bankruptcy is turned over to a court-appointed trustee who puts the
firm up for sale in an auction. This mandatory auction system has an attractive simplicity. All
debt claims are stayed during the auction period and the bids determine whether the firm will
be continued as a going concern or liquidated piecemeal. Payment must be in cash, allowing the
auction proceeds to be distributed to creditors strictly according to absolute priority. Moreover,
the auctions are quick (lasting an average of two months) and relatively cost-efficient, and as much
as three-quarters of the filing firms survive the auction as a going concern (Thorburn, 2000). A
going-concern sale takes place by merging the assets and operations of the auctioned firm into the
bidder firm, or into an empty corporate shell—much like a leveraged buyout transaction.
There is an ongoing debate over the relative efficiency of auction bankruptcy versus Chapter
11 in the U.S., where firms are reorganized in bankruptcy. Proponents of a more market-oriented
auction system point to costs associated with conflicts of interests and excessive continuation of
operations due to managerial control over the restructuring process in Chapter 11.1 Perhaps as a
result, there is a trend towards increased use of market-based mechanisms in the U.S., as evidenced
by prepackaged bankruptcies (Betker, 1995; ?), participation by distressed investors (Hotchkiss
and Mooradian, 1997), and sales in Chapter 11 (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 1998; Maksimovic and
Phillips, 1998). In fact, Baird and Rasmussen (2003) report that more than three-quarters of
all large Chapter 11 cases resolved in 2002 involved the sale of company assets or a prepackaged
bankruptcy procedure.
On the other hand, proponents of Chapter 11 argue that the time pressure of an auction system
is costly as it possibly causes excessive liquidation of economically viable firms when potential
bidders in the auction are themselves financially constrained. However, ? fail to find auction fire-
sale discounts in going-concern sales, and the three-quarters survival rate reported for the Swedish
auction system is similar to that of Chapter 11.2 Also, in Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) we show
that firms purchased as going concerns in the auction tend to perform at par with non-bankrupt
1See, e.g., Baird (1986), Bebchuk (1988), Jensen (1989), Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992), Bebchuk and Chang
(1992), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), and Baird (1993). Hotchkiss (1995) finds that firms emerging from Chapter
11 tend to underperform their industry rivals which is consistent with excessive continuation.
2See, e.g., White (1984), Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), LoPucki and Whitford (1993), and Hotchkiss,
John, Mooradian, and Thorburn (2008) for a review.
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industry rivals.
In this paper, we study an empirical issue of importance for the workings of the auction system:
the incentives and opportunities of the bankrupt firm’s major creditor to influence the auction
outcome. We show that creditor incentives have the potential for affecting both the liquidity and
allocative efficiency of bankruptcy auctions. Our empirical evidence is based on 260 private Swedish
firms auctioned in bankruptcy. The average firm has $5 million in sales and assets of $2 million ($8
million and $4 million, respectively, in 2007 dollars), and it has an average of forty-five employees.
This small-firm evidence is of interest to the U.S. debate as a majority of Chapter 11 filings are also
by small private firms: Chang and Schoar (2007) report average sales of $2 million and twenty-two
employees in a large and representative sample of Chapter 11 filings between 1989 and 2003. Bris,
Welch, and Zhu (2006) report that the median firm filing for Chapter 11 has assets of $1 million.
In our sample, as is common for small firms, the bankrupt firm’s secured creditor is a bank.
Upon filing, whenever the bank’s debt claim is impaired, the bank becomes the firm’s residual
claimant and therefore effectively the seller in the auction. Auction rules and banking regulations
prevent the bank from openly enforcing a seller reserve price (it can neither bid directly nor refuse
to sell). However, we observe that the bank often finances the winning bidder in the auction.
We postulate that the bank uses this bid financing as a vehicle for engineering a (bank-bidder)
coalition to get around the auction bidding constraint. Under certain conditions, the coalition
optimally overbids, i.e., bids more than the private valuation of the bank’s coalition partner. We
show that the optimal coalition bid mimics the sales price of a monopolist seller when the bank’s
debt is greatly impaired. In this situation, the bank effectively enforces a reserve price and raises
its expected debt recovery. This also raises the possibility that the bankrupt firm ends up being
acquired by a relatively inefficient bidder. Allocative inefficiency occurs when the bank-bidder
coalition wins against a rival bidder that has a higher private valuation of the target.3
Our empirical analysis addresses both the overbidding- and efficiency aspects of the auctions.
First, we present a unique test for the existence of overbidding based directly on auction premiums.
3Issues of auction efficiency also arise in the context of fire-sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; ?), the choice of
auction versus renegotiation (Hansen and Thomas, 1998; Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 2003), the payment method
(Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2000), and managerial investment in human capital
(Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender, 1997). In Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender (1997), participation in the bankruptcy
auction by a relatively informed creditor produces under-investment in managerial human capital ex ante. Our
argument below does not rely on the bank having an informational advantage over other bidders.
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To characterize the test approach, it is instructive to think of the bankruptcy event as creating
an instant ”bank toehold” equal to one (one hundred percent bank ownership of the auctioned
firm) when bank debt is impaired. As with toehold bidding in general, toeholds raise the bidder’s
reserve price above and beyond its private valuation—referred to as ”overbidding” (Burkart, 1995;
Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer, 1999). In our bankruptcy auction setting, bank-bidder coalition
overbidding increases the expected auction revenue flowing to the bank.4 Hotchkiss and Mooradian
(2003) also examine creditor overbidding incentives, but in the context of voluntary sales in Chapter
11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code.
Importantly, the coalition optimally overbids only if the bank’s debt claim is impaired at the
outset of the auction (further overbidding just benefits junior creditors). It is this cross-sectional re-
striction that makes overbidding testable in our setting. This restriction does not exist for takeovers
outside of bankruptcy. Extant empirical evidence on toehold-induced overbidding is therefore in-
direct. For example, theory implies that overbidding increases the probability of winning, which is
supported by studies of corporate takeover bids with equity toeholds (Betton and Eckbo, 2000).
Our tests require a measure of the degree of bank-debt impairment at the beginning of the
auction, capturing the bank’s overbidding incentive. We use the ex ante liquidation recovery rate,
defined as the firm’s expected piecemeal liquidation value scaled by the face value of the bank’s
debt. At the beginning of every auction, the bankruptcy trustee publishes an industry estimate of
the piecemeal liquidation value, which we use directly. Bidders appear to rely on this estimate as
well: when the auction does lead to piecemeal liquidation, the average price paid by the winning
bidder is close to (on average eight percent above) the trustee’s estimate. In contrast, when the
bankrupt firm is purchased as a going concern, the average auction premium more than doubles
the trustee’s piecemeal liquidation value estimate.
In theory, the greater the liquidation recovery rate, the lower is the incentive to overbid and,
in turn, the lower is the expected premium paid by the winning bidder. We find that when the
firm is sold as a going concern, auction premiums are decreasing in the liquidation recovery rate,
as predicted. Equally important, there is no evidence of overbidding in auction premiums in
subsamples where the theory implies zero overbidding incentive. There are two such subsamples,
4Burkart (1995) alludes to the analogy between an impaired debt claim and a toehold: “When a bankrupt firm’s
assets are auctioned off, the firm’s creditors are in a similar position to that of a large shareholder” (p. 1506).
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representing forty percent of the total sample. The first subsample consists of auctions that result
in a going-concern sale, but where the bank’s debt is not impaired at the ex ante liquidation value.
In this case, the bank has no incentive to push for a coalition bidding strategy since any revenue
increase flows to junior creditors. Second, overbidding for targets that are expected to be liquidated
piecemeal is suboptimal because these targets have only negligible going-concern value. When no
bidder values the target as a going concern, there are no rents to be extracted from rival bidders
through overbidding. We detect no evidence of overbidding in either subsample. Overall, our test
results provide surprisingly robust support for our coalition overbidding theory.
Our main overbidding theory presumes that that bank managers act in the interest of the
bank’s shareholders by attempting to maximize auction revenue. We also consider an alternative
coalition bidding strategy, dubbed “debt rollover”. Here, entrenched bank managers use the first-
price auction to roll over impaired bank debt at face value in order to hide non-performing loans
from their superiors. Under the rollover hypothesis, the coalition’s bid equals the face value of
the bank debt (plus any debt senior to the bank), effectively establishing a price floor in the
auction. While the rollover hypothesis also implies overbidding, it predicts an auction revenue that
is approximately equal to the face value of the bank’s debt when the coalition wins. The data
rejects this prediction.
Overbidding results in allocative inefficiency whenever the bank-bidder coalition wins against
a higher-valuation bidder. Thus, a second objective of our empirical analysis is to shed light on
whether the auction system tends to produce inefficient outcomes due to overbidding. Previous work
shows that firms restructured under Swedish bankruptcy auctions typically perform at par with
non-bankrupt industry rivals (Eckbo and Thorburn, 2003). However, the previous evidence does
not condition on bank financing and overbidding incentives. The intersection of bank financing of
the winning bidder and high overbidding incentives is the ideal place to look for ex post allocative
inefficiency. We find post-bankruptcy operating performance to be at par with industry rivals
for these subgroups of auctions as well. If anything, the operating performance is higher in the
subsample where the bank-bidder coalition wins and overbidding incentives are high ex ante.
Finally, we show that the probability of bankruptcy refiling over the two years following the auc-
tion is significantly greater when the bank finances the winning bidder. This refiling probability is,
however, independent of overbidding incentives and therefore cannot be attributed to inefficiencies
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in the auction per se. A consistent interpretation is that banks tend to finance relatively high-risk
restructuring prospects. In sum, bank-financing of bidders increases auction liquidity, and seem to
result in overbidding without significantly distorting the restructuring process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the coalition-bidding model and the
model’s central empirical implications. Section 3 describes the data selection and sample char-
acteristics. Section 4 performs the main cross-sectional tests for overbidding. Section 5 shows
post-bankruptcy performance statistics, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Bank-bidder coalition overbidding
In this section, we develop the overbidding hypothesis, its key empirical prediction (Proposition 1),
and we comment on factors that may attenuate overbidding incentives in our Swedish setting.
2.1 The auction setting
The Swedish bankruptcy code mandates an open bid first-price auction. As is common in the
toehold literature, we use the sealed-bid second-price analogy for analytical tractability.5 We
assume the existence of two bidders who are risk neutral and have unaffiliated private valuations of
the target firm. Bidder i’s private valuation of the auctioned firm’s asset is denoted vi ∈ [0, 1] (i =
1, 2). Private valuations are iid with distribution and density functions G(v) and g(v), respectively.
The bids determine whether the firm’s assets will be purchased individually (piecemeal liquidation)
or at the higher price required to continue the target as a going concern.
Denote the piecemeal liquidation value by l, and the going-concern premium by p, so that the
total price paid by the winning bidder is p + l. The trustee provides bidders with a professional
industry estimate of l at the start of the auction. Our auction premium data below suggests that
bidders tend to treat l as a minimum price in the auction: when the auction results in piecemeal
liquidation, the price paid is on average 8% higher than the estimate l. In contrast, when the
auction outcome is a sale of the target as a going concern, the price paid averages 2.25 times l, or
a going-concern premium of p = 125%. For simplicity, we treat l as a known constant, and derive
5With zero bidding costs, the sealed-bid second-price auction is revenue-equivalent to the open first-price auction
and it produces identical asset allocation (Klemperer, 2000; Dasgupta and Hansen, 2007).
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optimal bids bi determining the auction premium p. We reintroduce l in Section 2.4 when deriving
testable restrictions of the theory.
2.2 The coalition’s optimal bid
While the bank cannot bid directly in the auction, there are no regulatory restrictions on the
bank’s ability to issue debt to a bidder. Suppose the bank approaches a randomly selected bidder
(henceforth bidder 1) and offers to finance the acquisition should the bidder win the auction.
Bidding alone, the optimal bid of bidder 1 is b1 = v1.
6 Assuming l = 0, the following represents an
incentive-compatible coalition bid strategy:
Proposition 1 (optimal coalition bid strategy): Let l = 0 and suppose the bank
is the bankrupt firm’s only senior creditor, holding a debt claim with face value f. The
following represents a revenue-maximizing coalition bid strategy:
bc =

v1 + h(bc) if v1 ≤ f − h(bc) (unconstrained overbidding)
f if f − h(bc) < v1 < f (constrained overbidding)
v1 if v1 ≥ f, (no overbidding)
(1)
where h(bc) ≡ [1−G(bc)]/g(bc) is the inverse of the hazard function at bc.
Proof: Starting with the coalition bid under unconstrained overbidding, the expected revenue pic
to the bank-bidder coalition from unconstrained bidding is
pic =
∫ 1
bc
bcg(v2)dv2 +
∫ bc
0
v1g(v2)dv2 = bc[1−G(bc)] + v1G(bc), (2)
where the first term on the right-hand-side is the expected revenue if the coalition loses to bidder
2, and the second term is the net payoff of (v1 − b2) + b2 = v1 times the probability of winning,
G(bc). The first-order condition with respect to bc is
∂pic
∂bc
= 1−G(bc)− bcg(bc) + v1g(bc) = 0, (3)
6Dropping out of the auction when b1 < v1 means foregoing a positive expected profit from winning at a price less
than v1. Moreover, a bid of b1 > v1 implies a negative expected profit conditional on winning.
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which yields the optimal coalition bid bc = v1 + h(bc).
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Turning to the constrained overbidding price in Eq. (1), this bid reflects the effect of the bank-
debt face value f . As the senior claimant, the bank has no incentive to help generate an auction
revenue that exceeds f , as every dollar of additional overbidding is transferred directly to junior
creditors. Thus, when f − h(bc) < v1 < f , the coalition bids bc = f . Finally, when v1 ≥ f , the
creditor toehold is effectively zero, and the coalition optimally bids bidder 1’s private valuation,
bc = v1.
By raising the price in the auction, overbidding produces a wealth transfer from bidder 2 to the
coalition when v2 > bc > v1. The optimal coalition bid strategy is illustrated in Figure 1 for the
case of the uniform distribution, vi ∼ U [0, 1]. The horizontal axis plots v1 and the bold-faced line
shows the coalition bid bc. The first segment of the bold-faced line is the unconstrained overbidding
price, bc = v1 +h(bc) = (v1 + 1)/2. The second (horizontal) segment is the constrained overbidding
price, bc = f , which occurs when f − h(bc) < v1 < f . The segment starts when v1 is such that the
unconstrained bid price equals the face value f . The third segment starts when v1 > f . Here, the
bank’s debt is fully paid off without overbidding, so that bc = v1.
2.3 Incentive compatibility and bid delegation
Coalition overbidding is ex post costly for bidder 1 unless the highest-valuation bidder wins. Since
bidder 1 is responsible for paying the bid, the coalition agreement must include a compensating
transfer to bidder 1. Proposition 2 holds that there exists a positive transfer from the bank to
bidder 1, which satisfies the participation constraint by both coalition parties:
Proposition 2 (incentive compatibility): Let c denote the cost to bidder 1 of par-
ticipating in the coalition, and t the bank’s net revenue from coalition bidding (net of
the bank’s revenue without coalition bidding). Conditional on the optimal coalition bid
strategy bc in Proposition 1, E(t) > E(c) so coalition formation is incentive compatible.
7To ensure uniqueness, G must be twice continuously differentiable and satisfy the monotonicity condition
∂h−1(v)/∂v ≥ 0.
7
Proof: We have that
c =

0 if v2 ≤ v1 ≤ bc (coalition wins and pays v2 ≤ v1)
v2 − v1 if v1 < v2 ≤ bc (coalition wins and pays v2 > v1)
0 if v1 ≤ bc < v2 (coalition loses)
(4)
The expected overbidding cost to bidder 1 is
E(c) =
∫ bc
v1
(v2 − v1)g(v2)dv2. (5)
The bank’s net revenue t is given by
t =

0 if v2 ≤ v1 ≤ bc (coalition wins and pays v2 ≤ v1)
v2 − v1 if v1 < v2 ≤ bc (coalition wins and pays v2 > v1)
bc − v1 if v1 ≤ bc < v2 (coalition loses)
(6)
The expected net revenue is
E(t) =
∫ bc
v1
(v2 − v1)g(v2)dv2 + (bc − v1)(1−G(bc)) = E(c) + (bc − v1)(1−G(bc)). (7)
Since, with overbidding, bc > v1, it follows that E(t) > E(c) and the bank’s expected net revenue
is sufficient to cover the coalition partner’s expected overbidding cost.
Figure 3 illustrates the gains and losses from coalition bidding for the uniform case. The vertical
axis is bidder 2’s valuation v2 and the horizontal axis is G(v2). Area A equals bidder 1’s expected
profit from bidding alone. Area C is the bank’s expected revenue without coalition formation.
Area E is the expected cost to bidder 1 from overbidding (the minimum transfer), while the bank’s
expected net revenue E(t) equals area D+E. Area D is the expected wealth transfer from bidder 2
resulting from coalition overbidding and thus the coalition’s net surplus (which motivates coalition
formation).
To induce participation by bidder 1 in the coalition, the coalition agreement may stipulate a
transfer of an amount at least equal to E(c) (area E) ex ante (at the beginning of the auction).
Alternatively, the agreement may arrange for at least v2− v1 to be paid to bidder 1 conditional on
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winning against a less efficient bidder (v1 < v2). Since the loan takes effect only if the coalition
wins, a simple way to effectuate this ex post transfer is for the bank to reduce the interest on the
loan.
After establishing the optimal coalition bid strategy and a compensating transfer to bidder 1,
the bank may fully delegate bidding to its coalition partner. This follows because the transfer
to bidder 1 increases its private valuation of the auctioned firm. Since it is a dominant strategy
for bidder 1 to bid its private valuation (when bidding alone), the transfer causes bidder 1 to
voluntarily raise its bid. Thus, the transfer plays the dual role of inducing bidder 1 to participate
and to delegate the coalition bidding strategy.
2.4 The bank as monopolist seller
As mentioned in the introduction, although the bank is effectively a monopolist seller in the auction,
regulatory constraints prevent it from enforcing a seller reserve price. By forming a coalition,
however, the bank gets around the regulatory constraint. To see why, let bm denote the price
charged by a monopolist seller in a take-it-or-leave-it offer to sell the bankrupt firm, and suppose
the monopolist seller’s alternative use is worth v1, so the expected opportunity cost of selling
is v1[1 − G(bm)]. Moreover, the expected sales revenue is bm[1 − G(bm)]. Equating the expected
marginal revenue [1−G(bm)−bmg(bm)] with expected marginal cost [−v1g(bm)] yields a monopolist
selling price of bm = v1 +h(bm) which is identical to the unconstrained coalition bid in Proposition
1. In other words, the coalition bid bc allows the bank to achieve its expected revenue objective
despite the institutional restriction preventing the bank from directly enforcing its seller reserve
price.
2.5 Factors attenuating overbidding
A number of factors may work to attenuate the degree of coalition overbidding. If the bank is not
the sole member of its creditor class, its toehold is reduced from a value of one to the proportion
θ < 1 of the creditor class owned by the bank (Hotchkiss and Mooradian, 2003). This scales down
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the overbidding amount, as terms involving h(bc) in Eq. (1) are replaced by θh(bc).
8 Empirically,
the case with θ < 1 is irrelevant for our Swedish data where the bank is always the sole member of
its debt class.
Second, in small- and medium-sized Swedish companies, it is common for the bank to demand
a personal loan guarantee from the owner-manager. Such loan guarantee effectively makes the
owner a residual claimant in the auction—with a concomitant reduction in the impairment of the
bank’s debt. The loan guarantee provides the old owner with an incentive to overbid even without
formation of a coalition. In a saleback coalition, where the old owner is attempting to buy back
the firm, the existence of a personal guarantee eliminates the need for a transfer to induce coalition
overbidding. We address this possibility by treating salebacks as a separate category in parts of
the empirical analysis.
Third, our analysis presumes that bidder 1, following coalition formation, fully reveals v1 to
the bank. Full revelation is a standard assumption in the literature on reorganization of financially
distressed firms.9 It can be shown, however, that the transfer necessary to induce bidder 1 to
participate in the coalition is decreasing in v1.
10 As a result, the bidder may have an incentive to
understate v1 in order to increase the transfer under the coalition agreement. In this case, bidder
1 seeks to capture informational rents which reduces the bank’s profit and the overall incentive to
form a coalition, possibly to the point where coalition formation is no longer incentive compatible
for the bank.
Again, with symmetric information, the bank’s coalition profit exceeds the minimum transfer
8As in Burkart (1995), the coalition’s maximization problem (unconstrained by f) is now
Maxbc pic =
∫ bc
0
[v1 − (1− θ)v2]g(v2)dv2 + θbc(1−G(bc)).
The first term is the expected profit if the coalition wins and acquires the remaining 1 − θ portion of the firm at a
price of v2. The second term is the expected profit when bidder 2 wins and purchases the coalition’s toehold at the
price bc. The first-order condition is (v1− (1− θ)bc)g(bc) + θ[1−G(bc)]− θbcg(bc) = 0. Rearranging yields an optimal
(unconstrained) coalition bid of bc = v1 + θh(bc).
9See, e.g. Bulow and Shoven (1978), Brown (1989), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Stro¨mberg (2000), Hotchkiss
and Mooradian (2003).
10The partial derivatives with respect to v1 of the participation constraints for the bidder (Eq. 5) and the bank
(Eq. 7) are, respectively,
∂E(c)
∂v1
= (bc − v1)g(bc) ∂bc
∂v1
− [G(bc)−G(v1)] ≤ 0
∂E(t)
∂v1
= [1−G(bc)] ∂bc
∂v1
− [1−G(v1)] ≤ 0
given the monotonicity condition ∂h−1(v)/∂v ≥ 0.
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necessary to induce participation by bidder 1. The bank has an incentive to allocate some or all of
this excess profits towards reducing the information advantage of bidder 1, e.g. by purchasing an
audit. Alternatively, the bank may approach a bidder with whom it has a prior banking relationship.
Thus, the degree of information asymmetry between the bank and its coalition partner may well
be limited in practice.
2.6 A testable restriction on overbidding
We now bring the piecemeal liquidation value l back into the analysis. Let r ≡ l/f ∈ [0, 1] denote
the bank’s recovery rate at the piecemeal liquidation value. Thus, r is the fraction of the face value
expected to be recovered by the bank if the firm is liquidated piecemeal.
Proposition 3 (expected going-concern premium): Given the optimal coalition
bid bc in Eq. (1), the expected going-concern premium E(p) paid by the winner in the
auction decreases as the bank’s liquidation recovery rate r increases.
Proof: The proposition is that r affects E(p) via its impact on the expected coalition bid E(bc) so
that
∂E(p)
∂r
=
∂E(p)
∂E(bc)
∂E(bc)
∂r
< 0 (8)
We proceed by showing that ∂E(p)/∂E(bc) > 0 and that that ∂E(bc)/∂r < 0. Notice first that
coalition overbidding increases the expected premium paid by the winning bidder: if the coalition
wins, the expected premium is E(v2|bc) > E(v2|v1), and if it loses, bidder 2 pays bc > v1. In other
words, ∂E(p)/∂E(bc) > 0. Second, using the integral limits defined in Eq. (1), we have that
E(bc) =
∫ f−h(bc)
0
[v1 + h(bc)]g(v1)dv1 +
∫ f
f−h(bc)
fg(v1)dv1 +
∫ 1
f
v1g(v1)dv1 (9)
Replacing f with f(r) ≡ l/r, and defining k(r) ≡ f(r)− h(bc):
E(bc) =
∫ k(r)
0
[v1 + h(bc)]g(v1)dv1 + f(r)[G(f(r))−G(k(r))] +
∫ 1
f(r)
v1g(v1)dv1 (10)
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The first-order condition with respect to r is
∂E(bc)
∂r
= [k(r) + h(bc)]g(k(r))k
′(r) + f ′(r)[G(f(r))−G(k(r))]
+f(r)[g(f(r))f ′(r))− g(k(r))k′(r)]− f(r)g(f(r))f ′(r) (11)
Since f ′(r) = k′(r) = −l/r2 < 0 and f(r) > k(r):
∂E(bc)
∂r
= f ′(r)[G(f(r))−G(k(r))] < 0 (12)
Thus, ∂E(p)/∂r < 0.
Intuitively, increases in the piecemeal liquidation value l effectively reduce the face value at
risk for the bank. Figure 2 illustrates how changes in l affect the liquidation recovery rate r and
the expected amount of overbidding E(bc − v1) for f = 0.8 and the uniform distribution. Here,
E(bc − v1) equals the shaded area above the diagonal line and below f − l. Increases in l increase
r and decrease E(bc − v1). The figure shows three alternative values of l: l = 0.0, l = 0.1, and
l = 0.2. The corresponding expected amounts of overbidding are represented by the shaded areas
below f − l = 0.8, f − l = 0.7, and f − l = 0.6, respectively. The downward shifts in f − l reduce
the region for overbidding.
Proposition 3 forms the basis for our cross-sectional empirical tests of overbidding. If the firm
is sold as a going concern (reflecting vi > 0 and therefore p > 0), and provided that the bank’s debt
is impaired ex ante at the piecemeal liquidation value (so that r < 1), the proposition holds that r
affects the final winning price through E(bc). A first-order test of the theory is therefore achieved
by regressing p on r. Overbidding implies a negative coefficient on r in this regression. Specifics of
the test approach are found in Section 4 below.
3 Data and sample characteristics
3.1 The auction setting
When a company files for Swedish bankruptcy, the control rights are transferred to a court-
appointed trustee who puts the firm up for sale in an open first-price auction. Buyers are free
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to place bids for individual assets (piecemeal liquidation) or for the entire firm (going concern
sale). The highest bid wins, so going concern offers dominate competing piecemeal liquidation
bids. We do not observe auctions with a mix of piecemeal liquidation and going concern bids,
possibly because it is common knowledge among bidders when a company’s going concern value is
close to zero and the firm should be liquidated piecemeal. In general, the bidding process is open
for one month and the firm is sold within 2 months of filing (Thorburn, 2000).
The firm and its business operations receive protection during the auction bankruptcy proce-
dure, much as in Chapter 11. Debt payments and collateralized assets are stayed. The incumbent
management team is often retained to run the operations under the trustee’s supervision until
the sale is completed. Bankruptcy law permits operating costs incurred while in bankruptcy to
be paid in cash, effectively granting these costs super-priority status. While the law also permits
debtor-in-possession financing, such debt issues are never observed, reflecting the swift auction
process.
Bidders are required to pay in cash. They often form a shell company that, financed by debt
and equity, acquires the bankrupt firm’s assets much like in an LBO. Alternatively, the bidder
merges the bankrupt target with its own operations. The cash proceeds from the auction, net
of the trustee’s fees and expenses, are distributed to creditors strictly according to the absolute
priority of the debt claims. For the average sample firm, the debt structure is as follows (Thorburn,
2000): rent and audit costs (senior to the bank) 1%, bank debt 39%, tax and wage claims (junior
to the bank) 28%, and trade credits (junior to all other claims) 32%.
The trustee’s fiduciary duty is to creditors. The auction process and outcome is monitored
by a government supervisory agency (TSM). If an insider of the bankrupt firm is the only bidder
(attempting a saleback of the firm), the trustee is required to search for competing bids. More-
over, firms sometimes negotiate a sale of the assets right before filing. While such prepackaged
arrangements (refereed to below as ”auction prepacks”) are subject to approval by the trustee and
secured creditors, they are rarely overturned (Thorburn, 2000). The trustee does not provide the
piecemeal liquidation value estimate l for auction prepacks. We return to the implication of this in
the empirical analysis below.
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3.2 Characteristics of auctioned firms
We use a sample of 260 bankruptcy cases between 1/1988 and 12/1991 originally compiled by
Stro¨mberg and Thorburn (1996) and Thorburn (2000), drawn from the population of 1,159 bankrupt
Swedish companies with at least 20 employees. The sample is restricted to bankruptcies in the
four largest administrative provinces in Sweden, including the country’s four main metropolitan
areas, Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmo¨ and Uppsala. We expand the sample information with auc-
tion characteristics—including final auction prices—required to test our overbidding hypotheses.
Liquidation-value estimates and bid information are obtained from trustee reports and in direct
communication with trustees. Data on bank financing of bidders are from the national register
of corporate floating charge claims (”Inskrivningsmydigheten fo¨r Fo¨retagsinteckning”) and com-
plemented by the trustees. Company financial statements for all Swedish firms with at least 20
employees are obtained from UpplysningsCentralen (UC) AB. As described below, this information
is used to construct a measure of industry-wide financial distress.
As shown in Panel A of Table 1, 53 firms (20% of the sample) are sold as going concerns in a
prepack. Of the remaining 207 firms auctioned off in bankruptcy, 147 (61%) are sold as a going
concern and 60 (29%) are liquidated piecemeal. Panel A also shows the distribution of sample
firms across different industries. Almost one-third of the sample (81 firms) is in the manufacturing
industry. The remaining firms are distributed between construction (37 firms), transport (28 firms),
hotels and restaurants (28 firms), trade and retail of goods (45 firms) and services (41 firms). A
relatively large fraction of firms in the transport industry (12 firms or 43%) are liquidated piecemeal,
while a relatively large fraction of firms in hotels and restaurants (9 firms or 32%) and trade and
retail of goods (15 firms or 33%) are sold in prepacks.
Panel B of Table 1 shows selected firm characteristics from the last financial statement reported
prior to bankruptcy filing. The sample firms are small, with an average book value of assets of $2.3
million (median $1.2 million) and sales of $4.7 million. The mean (median) number of employees
is 43 (29). Operating profitability is generally poor, with a mean (median) ratio of EBITDA/sales
of -0.2% (1.8%), and firms are highly leveraged with typical debt levels exceeding 90% of book
value of assets. All firms in the sample are privately held and have concentrated ownership. At
bankruptcy filing, the CEO owns on average 60% of the equity. There is no discernible difference
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in the financial ratios between firms sold in prepacks, auctioned as going concerns or liquidated
piecemeal.
3.3 Bid activity and auction premiums
The trustees keep records of potential bidders who show an interest in buying the firm’s assets.
These potential rivals induce competitive bidding also when their interest fails to translate into an
actual bid, since a low offer may encourage entry. In the empirical analysis below, we condition
premium regressions on the level of potential competition in the auction.
We have data on bidder interest in 195 cases. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, in 77 (75%)
of 102 going-concern sales in bankruptcy, multiple bidders express an interest in participating in
the auction. In the sample of auction prepacks, we find bid competition in only 5 (15%) of 33
cases. This data may, however, be incomplete since the trustee in prepacks approves the firm’s
purchase agreement after the buyer has been selected. In piecemeal liquidations, where bids are
for individual assets, there is multiple bidder interest in 16 (80%) of 20 auctions.
The filing firm’s bank can help increase liquidity in the auction by offering financing to bidders.
Panel A of Table 2 presents information on the bank financing of the winning bidder for a total
of 130 going concern sales. The bank finances the winning bidder in half (49%) of the cases,
distributed as 20 of 35 auction prepacks and 44 of 95 going-concern auctions. When the old bank
does not finance the winning bidder, it either finances a losing bid or none of the bids. There are,
however, no public records of bank financing commitments for losers in the auction. Overall, we
conclude that the bankrupt firm’s bank adds liquidity to the bankruptcy auctions.
Panel B of Table 2 lists the average and standard error of the mean for the auction premium
and bank debt recovery rates. The auction premium is the price paid by the winning bidder in the
auction in excess of the trustee’s liquidation value estimate for the assets sold in the auction(la).
This value estimate, which is the sum of the individual second-hand values of the assets, is produced
by industry experts. Non-core assets such as real estate holdings, accounts receivables, securities,
cash holdings, etc., are often sold or collected separately also when the firm’s core operations are
auctioned as a going concern. Thus la < l, where l denotes the trustee’s estimate of the target’s total
piecemeal liquidation value at the start of the auction (used to define r). We use the bankruptcy
file to infer the asset exclusion in la.
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The premium p averages 8% for piecemeal liquidations with a standard error of 0.08. Using a
standard t-test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that p = la in piecemeal liquidations. In contrast,
the premium paid in going-concern auctions averages 125% with a standard error of 0.24. The p-
value for the difference in average premiums across going-concern sales and piecemeal liquidations is
0.00. Competition to run the surviving firm may explain the substantially greater premiums when
the firm is sold as a going concern. The trustee typically does not report a piecemeal liquidation
value estimate for auction prepacks, precluding a premium comparison for this subsample.
Turning to recovery rates, Panel B shows the bank’s liquidation recovery rate r as well as
the actual debt recovery rate. Recall that Proposition 3 defines r as min[l/f, 1], where f is the
face value of the bank’s debt. This definition assumes that the bank is the firm’s only senior
creditor. In our data, however, there is on average 1% of total debt outstanding that is senior to
the bank’s claim. Denoting this debt as s, we modify the definition of the liquidation recovery rate
to r ≡ min[(l− s)/f, 1]. The rescaling of l is purely for empirical purposes and does not affect the
above theoretical predictions involving r.
The average value of r is 45% in piecemeal liquidations and 66% in going-concern auctions.
This difference is statistically significant at the one percent level, indicating that firms that are
liquidated piecemeal tend to have more impaired bank debt at the outset of the auction. The
frequency distribution of r for going-concern auctions and piecemeal liquidations is plotted in
Figure 4. The bank receives full recovery at the trustee’s piecemeal liquidation value estimate
in 58 bankruptcy filings (30%). The 138 cases with less than full liquidation recovery are evenly
distributed across the range of r from 0 to 99%.
The actual distribution to banks (bank realized recovery rate) averages 69% (median 83%) of
the face value of bank debt. Bank recovery rates are on average significantly higher in prepacks and
going-concern auctions (77% and 76%, respectively) than in piecemeal liquidations (46%), again
reflecting the additional value created in auctions where the going-concern value of the firm is
preserved. The distribution of the realized bank recovery rate in going-concern sales and prepacks
are shown in Figure 5.
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4 Does coalition overbidding exist?
4.1 Testing the overbidding theory
Our approach to testing Proposition 3 is summarized in hypothesis H1:
H1 (Overbidding): In a regression of the ex post going-concern premium p on the
bank’s ex ante liquidation recovery rate r ≡ min[(l−s)/f, 1], let β denote the regression
coefficient on r. Proposition 3 predicts that β < 0 when the auction results in a going-
concern sale. Moreover, β = 0 when r = 1 (the bank debt is not impaired ex ante), and
when the firm is liquidated piecemeal (there is no going-concern premium).
We use a cross-sectional regression framework to test H1, where the log-auction premium ln(p) is
regressed on r as well as on a vector X of control variables. Structurally, the direction of causality
in this cross-sectional regression runs from r (observed at the beginning of the auction) to the
auction premium (determined ex post) through the hypothesized incentive to overbid. Also, in our
institutional setting, it is safe to assume that r is exogenous to the bank.11
Table 3 lists the variable definitions for the cross-sectional regressions. The control variables
in X include Piecemeal (indicator for piecemeal liquidation), Size (natural logarithm of book
value of total assets), Profmarg (pre-filing industry-adjusted operating profitability), and Tangible
(fraction of secured debt in the capital structure). Assuming that firms tend to lever up their
tangible assets, Tangible is a proxy for asset tangibility.12
Table 4 shows our main test results for the overbidding hypothesis. Panel A uses the total
sample of 175 going-concern sales and piecemeal liquidations with available data on l and p.13 The
first row of Table 4 shows the impact of r on ln(p) for the full sample of auctions. The regression
has an adjusted R2 of 0.15. The coefficient on r is -0.90 with a p-value of 0.00, which is consistent
with H1: auction premiums decrease in the bank’s ex ante liquidation recovery rate. As for the
control variables, the coefficient for Piecemeal is always negative and significant, which confirms
the earlier evidence in Table 2. Auction premiums are on average lower in piecemeal liquidations
11A bidder anticipating the bankruptcy event might attempt to acquire the bank’s toehold by purchasing the
distressed debt ahead of bankruptcy filing. However, there was no secondary market for bank debt in Sweden during
our sample period.
12This argument holds a fortiori for cash-constrained distressed firms. These firms often use all available debt
capacity by borrowing against tangible assets.
13As indicated earlier, l is unavailable for the 53 auction prepacks. We return to the auction prepacks below.
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than in going-concern sales, reflecting the absence of a going-concern premium. Of the remaining
control variables, only Tangible is statistically significant. The negative coefficient indicates that
bidders pay lower premiums for targets that have a relatively high proportion tangible assets.
Overbidding is restricted to going-concern sales as there is no rents to be extracted from bidders
when the target is liquidated piecemeal. To check for this effect of the auction outcome, the second
and the third regressions of Panel A permit r to have different impacts across going concern
sales (indicated by the binary variable Concern) and piecemeal liquidations. The two regression
specifications are as follows:
ln(p) =
 α+ β2r × Piecemeal + β3r × Concern+ γX + α+ β′1r + β′2r × Piecemeal + γX +  (13)
where α is the constant term, γ is the vector of regression coefficients for the control variables in X,
and  is an error term. In the first regression, β2 and β3 capture the separate effects of overbidding
in piecemeal liquidations and going-concern auctions. The second regression directly tests whether
the two coefficient estimates are significantly different from each other. To see why, note that the
second regression can be rewritten as α+β′1r(Piecemeal+Concern) +β′2r×Piecemeal+ γX + .
Comparing the two regressions, we have that β′1 ≡ β3, and that β′2 ≡ β2−β′1 ≡ β2−β3. H1 predicts
that β2 = 0, β3 < 0, and β
′
2 > 0 (i.e. that β2 > β3).
All of these predictions are borne out in the data. In the second regression of Panel A, the
coefficient β2 for r×Piecemeal is indistinguishable from zero (p-value 0.68), suggesting that there
is no overbidding in piecemeal liquidations. The coefficient β3 for r × Concern is negative and
highly significant, confirming the prediction of an overbidding effect in going concern sales. In the
third regression of Panel A, β′2 = 1.01 with a p-value of 0.01, confirming that the impact of r on
the auction premium is significantly different across going concerns and piecemeal liquidations.
According to our theory, overbidding is limited to cases where the bank’s debt is impaired at the
liquidation recovery rate. Panel B of Table 4 repeats the regressions from Panel A on the subsample
of auctions where r < 1. This eliminates 55 cases. All but one of the regression coefficients in Panel
B are close to those in Panel A, both in terms of magnitude and significance levels. Specifically,
the coefficient estimate for r is again negative and highly significant (p=0.00) for the full sample
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of 120. Moreover, the coefficients for r × Concern (β2) is negative and significant (p=0.00), while
the coefficient for r × Piecemeal (β1) is not significantly different from zero. The estimate of β′2,
however, is now 0.89 with a p-value of 0.13. Overall, the regression results in Table 4 strongly
suggest that lower values of the liquidation recovery rate r result in higher auction premiums for
going concern sales, while no such effect is discernible for piecemeal liquidations, as predicted by
H1.
4.2 Robustness tests
The coefficient estimate on r in the above regressions ignores the potential for estimation error in
the liquidation value estimates l and la. The auction price data shows that this estimation error is
small on average: recall from Table 2 that final market prices in the piecemeal liquidation category
are on average only 8% higher than the piecemeal liquidation value estimate la.14 A more important
issue is the fact that the liquidation value appears on both sides of the regression equation (ln(p)
contains 1/la and r contains l) and may therefore in part be driving the negative coefficient estimate
on r. Below, we resolve this issue by isolating the range of r where overbidding does not exist in
theory but in which the mechanical correlation remains present, and by orthogonalizing the effect
of l on r. Second, we examine the robustness of our overbidding evidence with respect to the
exclusion of prepack auctions (for which we do not have data on l). Third, since the theoretical
overbidding function (Proposition 1) is nonlinear, we test whether the data rejects the linearity
assumption behind our cross-sectional regressions. Our main conclusions appear robust to all of
these specification issues.
4.2.1 The role of the piecemeal liquidation value
Recall from Eq. (1) that when the bank’s debt is not impaired, (l − s)/f ≥ 1 so r = 1 and there
is no overbidding. Since r is truncated at one, it does not capture the cross-sectional variation in
14Even with estimation error, the impact on the coefficient on r is likely to be negligible. Write l = lˆu, where lˆ is the
true liquidation value and u is a (multiplicative) measurement error. Let P denote the price paid in the auction, and
consider a regression of the form ln(P/l) = α+βln(l/f)+e. Taking the logarithm, P − lˆ−u = α+β(lˆ−u−f)+ ln(e).
If we assume that Cov(P − lˆ, lˆ − f) = 0, then the bias in β from the measurement error in l is small—on the order
of σ2u/(σ
2
f−lˆ + σ
2
u), where σ
2 is the variance.
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(l − s)/f when this value exceeds one. Define the variable r∗ such that:
r∗ =
 (1− s)/f if r = 10 if r < 1 (14)
While Proposition 3 predicts a coefficient value of zero for r∗, the negative correlation between
ln(1/la) and l affects r and r∗ equally. Therefore, if this correlation is in fact driving the negative
coefficient estimate for r reported in Table 4, we should observe a negative coefficient estimate for
r∗ as well.
We test this hypothesis in Table 5. In the first regression, which uses the full sample, the
coefficient on r is -1.01 (p=0.00). This estimate is close to that reported earlier for the full sample
in Table 4. More importantly, the coefficient estimate for r∗ is only 0.02 with a p-value of 0.39.
The finding of an insignificant coefficient estimate for r∗ is reinforced by the results in panels B and
C. In Panel B, where the sample is restricted to going-concern sales, the coefficient on r is again
negative and significant, while the coefficient on r∗ is close to zero and insignificant. In Panel C,
where we restrict the sample to cases where r = 1 (no overbidding), the coefficient estimate for r∗
remains close to zero. These results suggest that the negative correlation between ln(1/la) and l
has only a negligible effect on the coefficient estimate for r. This evidence strengthens the empirical
support for the overbidding hypothesis.
Turning to the control variables, the inclusion of r∗ does not change the impact on auction
premiums of Piecemeal and Tangible, both of which receive negative and significant coefficients as
before. The table also includes regressors controlling for auction demand conditions. The variable
Industry distress measures the degree of industry-wide distress in the year of the bankruptcy filing.
This variable is defined as the fraction of firms with the same four-digit SIC industry code as the
sample firm that report an interest coverage ratio less than one or files for bankruptcy in the subse-
quent year. The interest coverage ratio is defined as (EBITDA+interest income)/interest expense.
The coefficient estimate for Industry distress is insignificant across all regression specifications.15
Panel B, which is restricted to going-concern sales, also controls for the degree of competition
and a saleback of the firm to target insiders. The former is represented by the binary variable
15? provide further evidence on the impact of industry illiquidity on bankruptcy auction prices.
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Multiple interest which indicates the presence of at least two firms expressing a serious interest
in bidding for the target, while the latter is the binary variable Saleback. Neither variable affect
auction premiums and their inclusion has only a negligible effect on the coefficient estimates for r
and r∗, respectively. In Section 2, we argue that since it is common for owner-managers of small
firms to issue a personal guarantee of the company’s bank debt, owner-managers may have their
own incentives to overbid. The insignificance of Saleback reported here suggests that any such
incentives do not on average have a separate premium impact—beyond what is already captured
by our measure of bank-debt impairment r. The regressions in Panel D show that inclusion of
Industry distress does not affect the coefficient estimate for r in the sample of piecemeal liqui-
dations. In this regression, and consistent with the overbidding theory, r receives an insignificant
coefficient.
Table 6 provides a final robustness check of whether the coefficient estimate for r is driven by
the negative correlation between ln(1/la) and l. In this table, we first estimate the impact of l on
r through an OLS regression r = γ0 + γ1ln(l) + r. By construction, the residuals r are orthogonal
to ln(l). We then replace r with r in the premium regressions. As shown in the table, r receives
a negative coefficient estimate of the same magnitude as r and is highly significant with p=0.00
across the full sample (Panel A) and going-concern auctions (Panel B), and it is insignificant for
piecemeal liquidations (Panel C). These results are again as predicted by our overbidding theory,
and they rule out a confounding effect of the correlation between ln(1/la) and l.
4.2.2 Auction prepack selection
As discussed above, because the trustee typically does not provide a piecemeal liquidation value
estimate l for auction prepacks, our premium regressions exclude this category of auctions. When
approaching bankruptcy, however, the firm self-selects whether to do an ordinary bankruptcy filing
or to find a buyer and file an auction prepack. For example, the firm may prefer to work out a
private auction prepack agreement if the bankruptcy auction itself is expected to be illiquid and
produce low prices (?). If so, since the sample truncates observations for l in prepacks, the OLS
estimates of the coefficient vector β reported in earlier tables may be biased.
We use a two-step Heckman (1979) procedure to control for this truncation problem. To illus-
trate, suppose the firm selects a prepack filing based on γ′Z, where Z is a vector of explanatory
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variables and γ is a vector of coefficients. If so, the true data generating process is
ln(p) =
 β
′X + u if γ′Z > uz (nonprepack filing)
β′1X + u1 if γ′Z ≤ uz (prepack filing)
(15)
where uz is the residual from the choice model γ
′Z. To account for this self-selection, we first esti-
mate the coefficients γ using probit for a regular (nonprepack) filing, where Z contains Industry distress,
Size, Profit margin, and Tangible. These variables reflect the effect of industry-wide distress on
auction illiquidity and the going-concern value that may be lost if the auction is illiquid, both of
which may induce an auction prepack. We then perform the following second-step regression using
weighted least squares:
ln(p) = β′X + η
φ(γ′Z)
Φ(γ′Z)
+ u, (16)
where φi and Φ in the inverse Mill’s ratio are the values of the standard normal density and the
cumulative normal distribution functions, respectively, evaluated at γ′Z.
The estimate of η and the coefficient vector β are shown Table 7. In Panel A, we use the full
sample of 175 firms auctioned in bankruptcy, while Panel B is restricted to 130 going-going concern
auctions. The Mill’s ratio receives an insignificant coefficient in all specifications, suggesting that it
is not necessary to control for prepack selection to generate unbiased estimates of β. The estimates
of β in Table 7 are similar to those reported above, with the exception of the coefficient for Tangible
which is now insignificant. Importantly, the coefficient estimate for r again supports the overbidding
hypothesis H1.
4.2.3 Linearity of the overbidding function
We have so far presumed a linear relationship between the winning auction premium and the
coalition’s overbidding incentive. As depicted in Figure 2, the relationship is linear for the case of
the uniform distribution and v1 < f−h(bc). However, the relationship may be non-linear (concave)
for other distributions G(v). Since our theoretical model does not identify the functional form G,
we apply a Box-Cox transformation to r.16 A Box-Cox transformation of the variable r, denoted
16See, e.g., Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, and Lee (1988) pp. 555-563.
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r(λ), is defined as
r(λ) =
 (r
λ − 1)/λ λ 6= 0
ln r λ = 0.
(17)
The resulting maximum likelihood estimate of λ determines the functional form of the relationship
with auction premiums, where λ = 1 implies linearity. Using the subsample of auctions where
r < 1, the Box-Cox transformation results in an estimated value of λ of 1.53 with a p-value of 0.69.
This estimate is statistically indistinguishable from either zero or one.
As a sensitivity analysis, we rerun the premium regression using a transformation of r with
λ = 1.53 and λ = 0. The results are shown in Table 8. For the subsample of going-concern sales
(Panel A), the coefficient estimate for r(λ) = (r1.53 − 1)/1.53 is -1.48 with a p-value of 0.00. In
Panel B, we repeat the regression with λ = 0, which results in a coefficient estimate for r(λ) = ln(r)
of -0.35 and a p-value of 0.00. Finally, in Panel C, we again use λ = 0 but the sample is now
restricted to piecemeal liquidations. The coefficient estimate for r(λ) = ln(r) is now an insignificant
-0.12 (p-value of 0.74). This evidence is uniformly consistent with the overbidding hypothesis H1
also when we allow a non-linear functional form for the overbidding variable r.
4.3 Agency and overbidding through bank-debt rollover
In the overbidding theory of Section 2, bank managers are assumed to work in the bank’s interest:
the coalition bid strategy maximizes expected auction revenue. Alternatively, suppose bank man-
agers are entrenched. If revealing credit losses lowers bank managers’ reputation, they may try to
rig the auction outcome by getting the bidder to roll over the bank’s debt at face value. Using
the notation from Section 2, and ignoring the piecemeal liquidation value (l = 0), the coalition
agreement is for bidder 1 to offer b′c = max[f + s, v1] and for the bank to transfer the overpayment
amount max[f + s− v1, 0] to bidder 1 conditional on winning.17
Under the rollover hypothesis, the bank is effectively trying to enforce a price floor (a seller re-
serve price) of f+s. Therefore, the auction must now be strictly first-price. The central implication
of this setup hypothesis is that the bank will always achieve full repayment f of its debt. Notice
also that the rollover strategy implies greater expected overbidding than under our overbidding
17Since the transfer f + s− v1 increases dollar for dollar as v1 falls below f + s, the bank manager has an incentive
to select a coalition partner with high private valuation v1. In contrast, in Section 2, the coalition is ”bidding to
lose”, so the bank prefers coalition partners with low private valuations v1.
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hypothesis in Section 2. In terms of Figure 1, the additional expected amount of overbidding—
which the bank must transfer ex post to its coalition partner—is equal to the area of the triangle
between the lines for f and bc. This aggressive overbidding also results in a higher probability that
the coalition wins against more efficient rivals (bc > v2 > v1).
The prediction of full recovery for the bank is testable. Starting with the full sample of 236
auctions with data on bank recovery rates, the bank receives full debt recovery in 34% of the total
sample. Focusing on the 181 going-concern sales and prepacks (excluding piecemeal liquidations),
the bank receives full recovery in 40% of the cases. As shown in Figure 5, for the 60% of the sample
with less than full bank recovery, realized bank recovery rates are evenly distributed between 0.40
and 0.90. Cases where the bank receive less than full recovery are inconsistent with debt rollover.
The most interesting place to look for debt rollover is when the bank-bidder coalition wins
and the coalition partner is a former owner-manager (i.e. a saleback). In the total sample of 111
salebacks, the bank finances the bidder in 42 cases. In 22 of these cases (52%), the bank receives
full recovery. Are these 22 cases the result of debt rollover? Within this group of 22, the average
auction price exceeds f + s by 91% (median 40%). That is, the bank’s coalition partner pays a
price in the auction than on average nearly doubles the bank’s face value f . The bank receives full
recovery because bidder 1’s valuation is high (v1 ≈ 2(f + s)) and not because of an attempt to rig
the auction. Our overall conclusion is therefore that debt rollover is not an important characteristic
of these bankruptcy auctions.
5 Overbidding and post-bankruptcy performance
Our empirical analysis suggests that creditor overbidding-incentives manifest themselves in actual
auction prices. As shown in Section 2 (Figure 3), overbidding may lead to an inefficient auction
outcome. When the bank-bidder coalition overbids and lose, bidder 2 has the highest private
valuation, and the outcome is efficient. However, when the coalition overbids and wins, there
are two possibilities: if v1 > v2 the outcome is efficient, while allocative inefficiency occurs when
v1 < v2.
What is the likely empirical relevance of the case where the coalition wins and bidder 2’s
private valuation exceeds that of bidder 1? As bidder private valuations are unobservable, this
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question can only be assessed indirectly. Since severe allocative inefficiency arguably results in
poor post-bankruptcy performance, we provide performance evidence as a function of our measure
of overbidding incentive r. Because the sample firms are all private, we use operating profitability
and bankruptcy refiling rates as measures of performance.
H2 (Overbidding and performance): Since the overbidding incentive is decreasing
in the liquidation recovery rate r (Proposition 3), the likelihood of the inefficient auction
outcome is also decreasing in r. If overbidding impacts allocative efficiency, average
post-bankruptcy operating performance and bankruptcy refiling rates are expected to be
greater following auctions with a high value of r than in auctions with a low value of r.
5.1 Post-bankruptcy operating performance
Post-bankruptcy performance estimation requires the identity of the newly restructured firm. We
have this information for a total of 111 of our targets sold as a going-concern and excluding prepacks.
Within this subsample, post-bankruptcy financial statements are available for a total of 83 firms
in the first year post-bankruptcy (year 1). Panel A of Table 9 reports median annual industry-
adjusted operating profitability (EBITDA/sales) for groups of auctions with high and low values
of the overbidding incentive r, and for the difference between two groups. As defined in Table 3,
rhigh indicates that r = 1, and rlow indicates that 0 < r ≤ 0.5. This eliminates 27 observations
with 0.5 < r < 1 and an additional five observations with missing information on r.
Moreover, we compare the performance across firms sold in auctions where the bank finances
the winning bidder (Bank = 1) and auctions where the bank did not finance the buyer (Bank =
0). When using the variable Bank, twenty-one of the 83 firms with post-bankruptcy financial
statements are eliminated due to missing information. Industry-adjusted is defined as the difference
between the firm and its median industry rival, where a rival is a firm with at least 20 employees
and with the same four-digit SIC industry code as the target.
Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, the typical sample firm has an operating profitability that
is statistically indistinguishable from its median industry rival for each of the four years following
bankruptcy. The p-values for the difference between auctions with high and low values of r are
also high in all four years. The same holds when we condition the sample on the indicator Bank.
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In principle, the greatest potential for an inefficient outcome in occurs when the coalition wins
(Bank = 1) and the overbidding incentives are high (r = rlow). The third group of observations
in Panel A focuses on this subsample by comparing the operating performance across cases with
rhigh and with rlow conditional on Bank = 1. If overbidding leads to an inefficient outcome, we
expect the performance differences shown in the last row of Panel A to be positive and significant.
Instead, they are significantly negative for years one and two, and insignificant thereafter.
We conclude from Panel A of Table 9 that the median post-bankruptcy operating performance
of auctioned targets is typically (1) indistinguishable from the performance of industry rivals, (2)
unaffected by whether the bank’s ex ante incentive to overbid is high or low, and (3) higher when
the coalition wins following high overbidding incentives. This evidence fails to support the joint
hypothesis H2 of overbidding and allocative inefficiency.
Panel B of Table 9 shows that the post-bankruptcy leverage ratios of the auctioned firms are
significantly higher than that of industry peers in years 1 and 2. There is, however, no difference
in the use of leverage across auctioned firms with high or low overbidding incentive r or with or
without old bank financing of the winning bidder. The greater leverage ratios after emerging from
bankruptcy may however carry with it a greater probability of refiling for bankruptcy, in particular
if the firm is restructured by a relatively inefficient buyer. We turn to the refiling rate next.
5.2 Bankruptcy refiling rates
Table 10 presents logit-estimates of the probability of bankruptcy refiling within two years of the
auction. The regressions use as explanatory variables the overbidding incentive r and its variants
r∗, rlow, and rhigh, as well as the industry- and firm characteristics Industry distress, Saleback,
Bank, Size, Proft margin, and Tangible. The sample contains 106 of the 111 surviving firms,
reflecting the missing information on r for five cases.
Of the nine regression specifications in Table 10, only the last four are statistically significant
using a standard Chi-square test. All nine regressions produce statistically insignificant coefficients
for all of the overbidding variables r. In other words, the bankruptcy refiling rate is unaffected by
the bank’s ex ante incentive to form a coalition and overbid. The only variable which affects the
refiling probability is Bank. That is, the refiling rate is significantly greater in the subsample where
the bank finances the winning bidder in the auction. Note also that the refiling rate is independent
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of whether the auction results in a saleback. The important factor appears to be bank financing
per se, and not whether the buyer is the firm’s old owner.18
However, when we introduce the interaction variables rlow ∗Bank and rhigh ∗Bank (not shown
in Table 10), we cannot reject the hypothesis that these two interaction variables have identical
coefficients. This means that, while refiling rates are higher when the bidder is financed by the
old bank, this effect of Bank is unrelated to whether the overbidding incentives are high or low
in the auction. Overall, we conclude that when the bank-bidder coalition wins the auction, the
coalition appears to have selected a relatively risky restructuring project (in terms of the refiling
rate). Moreover, since the operating performance indicate bidder efficiency also when the bank
finances the winner, the greater refiling risk occurs even if the bank’s coalition partner is relatively
efficient.
6 Conclusions
The Swedish automatic auction system has an attractive simplicity, and it provides an important
laboratory for examining the effectiveness of auctions to resolve bankruptcy. Previous research
has shown that the auctions result in a speedy and relatively low-cost restructuring of the filing
firms with no evidence of excessive liquidation (three-quarters survive as going concerns) or fire-
sale discounts in going-concern sales. In this paper, we focus on the incentives and opportunities
for the bankrupt firm’s main creditor—the bank—to influence the auction outcome in order to
increase expected bank-debt recovery. Regulatory constraints prevent banks from bidding in the
auction. However, we observe that the old bank frequently finances bidders, and we postulate that
the financing arrangement leads to joint bank-bidder offer strategies. The optimal bank-bidder
coalition strategy implies overbidding and mimics a monopolist seller’s reserve price. Thus, a
bank-bidder coalition strategy may allow the bank to circumvent the institutional constraint on
bank bidding in the auction.
We test for overbidding using cross-sectional regressions of the final auction premium on a
measure of the bank’s expected debt recovery rate if the firm is liquidated piecemeal (r). The
lower the value of r, the more impaired is the bank’s debt claim ex ante, and the greater the
18Inclusion of additional variables such as asset specificity, business cycle, and industry leverage does not alter this
conclusion.
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bank’s incentive to form a coalition and overbid. We find robust evidence that auction premiums
are decreasing in r. This inverse relationship is statistically significant and as predicted by the
overbidding hypothesis. The estimated relationship is robust to the inclusion of various firm- and
industry characteristics in the cross-sectional regressions, and to a correction for bidder self-selection
of the auction outcome. Moreover, evidence of overbidding occurs only for the relevant range of r
(where theory suggests overbidding). To our knowledge, this is the first test of auction overbidding
based directly on final auction prices.
Since overbidding by the bank-bidder coalition may lead to inefficient auction outcome (when
the coalition wins against a higher-valuation rival bidder), we also examine the post-bankruptcy per-
formance of the auctioned firms. The hypothesis is that larger overbidding incentives in the auction
(lower values of r) may lead to lower post-bankruptcy operating performance and/or bankruptcy
refiling probability. However, we find that post-bankruptcy operating performance is independent
of the ex ante overbidding incentive and whether or not the bank finances the winning bidder.
While the bankruptcy refiling rate is greater following bank financing of the winner, this effect is
also independent of overbidding incentives. We infer from this that the bank’s coalition partner
tends to be relatively efficient in terms of restructuring and operating the bankrupt firm’s assets.
Moreover, bank financing appears to be more likely in auctions where the bankrupt firm’s future
prospects are relatively risky.
In the U.S., there is a growing use of relatively low-cost, market-based mechanisms to resolve
bankruptcy. An interesting question for future research is whether moving towards greater use
of auctions would be beneficial in Chapter 11. The answer depends in part on to what extent
the Swedish auction mechanism is uniquely suited to the country’s legal and corporate governance
tradition. For example, there does not appear to be any serious risk of corruption of the auction
mechanism itself. Also, the auction mechanism may be better suited for firms with relatively
simple capital structures than for the more complex structures involving public ownership of debt.
However, the active market for corporate control in the U.S. suggests that neither firm size nor
capital structure complexity necessarily impede takeover auctions outside of bankruptcy.
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Figure 1
The bank-bidder coalition’s optimal bid, bc(v1), and the expected amount of
overbidding (shaded area), assuming a piecemeal liquidation value l of zero.
The figure is drawn assuming bidder valuations are distributed uniform, vi ∼ U [0, 1]. The
coalition-bidder’s private valuation is v1, f is the face value of the bank’s debt, and h(bc) is the
inverse hazard rate at bc. When v1 ≤ 2f − 1, the coalition fully overbids: bc = (v1 + 1)/2. When
f > v1 > 2f − 1, the coalition partially overbids: bc = f . When v1 ≥ f , the coalition does not
overbid: bc = v1.
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Figure 2
The expected amount of coalition overbidding for different values of the piecemeal
liquidation value l.
The figure illustrates how changes in l affect the expected amount of overbidding E(bc− v1), where
bc is the coalition’s optimal bid and v1 is the coalition bidder’s private valuation (distributed
uniform). The face value of the bank’s debt claim is set to f = 0.8. E(bc − v1) equals the shaded
area above the diagonal line (v1, bidder 1’s optimal bid with no overbidding) and below f − l.
As l increases, the bank’s liquidation recovery rate r = min[l/f, 1] increases and E(bc − v1)
decreases. The figure is drawn for three alternative values of l: l = 0.0, l = 0.1, and l = 0.2. The
corresponding expected amounts of overbidding are the shaded areas below f − l = 0.8, f − l = 0.7,
and f − l = 0.6, respectively. Thus, the downward shifts in f − l reduce the region for overbidding.
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Figure 3
Expected profits with and without coalition bidding.
The figure is drawn assuming bidder valuations are distributed uniform, vi ∼ U [0, 1]. G(v2) is
the cumulative distribution over v2. Bidder 2’s optimal bid is b2 = v2 (the diagonal line) and
the coalition’s optimal bid is bc. Area A is the expected profits to Bidder 1 and C is the bank’s
expected revenue under non-cooperative bidding. With coalition bidding, area E is bidder 1’s
expected cost of overbidding (the minimum transfer), and area E+D is the bank’s expected net
revenue from overbidding. Thus, area D is the coalition’s expected net surplus from overbidding
(which equals the expected wealth transfer from bidder 2).
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Figure 4
Frequency distribution of the liquidation recovery rate r at the beginning of the
auction.
The liquidation recovery rate is r = min[l/f, 1]∗100%, where l is the bankruptcy trustee’s estimate
(provided at the beginning of the auction) of the bankrupt firm’s piecemeal liquidation value and
f is the face value of the bank’s debt. Sample of 196 bankruptcy auctions, excluding auction
prepack filings.
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Figure 5
Frequency distribution of the bank’s realized debt recovery rate.
The bank’s realized recovery rate is its payoff in bankruptcy as a fraction of the face value of its
debt claim on the bankrupt firm. Sample of 181 Swedish firms auctioned as a going-concern or
filing a prepackaged bankruptcy, excluding piecemeal liquidation, 1988-1991.
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Table 1
Characteristics of the sample of 260 firms filing for bankruptcy in Sweden, 1988-1991
Total Prepack Going-concern Piecemeal
sample filing sale liquidation
A: Distribution of sample firms across industries
Manufacturing 81 13 50 18
Construction 37 7 22 8
Transport 28 3 13 12
Trade and retail of goods 45 15 23 7
Hotels and restaurants 28 9 12 7
Services 41 6 27 8
Total 260 53 147 60
B: Firm financial characteristics and CEO ownershipa
Total assets ($ million) Mean 2.3 2.6 2.2 2.2
Median 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1
Sales ($ million) Mean 4.7 6.2 4.1 4.7
Median 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.2
Number of employees Mean 43 47 44 36
Median 29 28 29 29
EBITDA/sales (%) Mean -0.2% 0.3% 0.2% -1.7%
Median 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 2.3%
Debt/assets Mean 0.92 0.88 0.94 0.94
Median 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.95
CEO equity ownership (%) Mean 60% 66% 56% 63%
Median 72% 100% 60% 81%
aThe financial data is from the last financial statement reported prior to filing. CEO ownership is from the
bankruptcy filing documents.
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Table 2
Bidder interest, bank financing, premiums and recovery rates
Total Prepack Going-concern Piecemeal
samplea filingb sale liquidation
A: Auction demand
Multiple buyers expressing an Number 98 5 77 16
interest in placing a bid Total 195 33 102 20
Percent 50% 15% 75% 80%
Bankrupt firm’s bank financing Number 64 20 44
the winning bidder Total 130 35 95 n/a
Percent 49% 57% 46%
B: Premiums and recovery rates
Auction premium (p− 1)c Average 94% 125% 8%
Std error 18% n/a 24% 8%
N 175 130 45
Bank liquidation recovery rate (r)d Average 0.60 0.66 0.45
Median 0.68 n/a 0.77 0.39
Std error 0.03 0.03 0.05
N 196 141 55
Bank realized recovery ratee Average 0.69 0.77 0.76 0.46
Median 0.83 0.91 0.89 0.40
Std error 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
N 236 40 141 55
aSample of 260 firms filing for bankruptcy in Sweden, 1988-1991.
bIn prepacks, the trustee typically does not report a piecemeal liquidation value estimate, hence the missing
information on the auction premium and the bank liquidation recovery rate.
cThe auction premium is the price paid by the winning bidder in excess of the trustee’s piecemeal liquidation
value estimate la of the auctioned assets. If the auction excludes some liquid assets (such as cash balances, accounts
receivables and real estate), then la < l, where l is the trustee’s estimate of the total piecemeal liquidation value of
the bankrupt firm’s assets.
dThe liquidation recovery rate r is the bank’s recovery rate on its debt if the winning bidder pays the trustee’s
piecemeal liquidation value estimate l. Specifically, r = min[(l− s)/f, 1], where f is the face value of the bank’s debt
and s is the face value of all debt senior to the bank.
eRealized payoff to the bank divided by the face value of its claim f on the bankrupt firm.
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Table 3
Definitions of variables used in cross-sectional regressions for overbidding
Variable name Definition
A: Variables for direct tests of overbidding
p Auction premium: the price paid in the auction divided by the trustee’s estimate of the
piecemeal liquidation value la of the auctioned assets.a The auction determines p.
r Bank’s liquidation recovery rate: r = min[(l− s)/f, 1], where f is the face value of the bank’s
debt and s is the face value of any debt senior to the bank. r is the bank’s debt recovery
obtained in the event that the bankruptcy proceeds equal l, the trustee’s estimate of the firm’s
total piecemeal liquidation value. r < 1 implies incentive to overbid.
r∗ r∗ = (l − s)/f for r = 1, and r∗ = 0 for r < 1. r∗ ≥ 1 implies no incentive to overbid
rlow Indicates that 0 < r ≤ 0.5, which implies incentives to overbid.
rhigh Indicates that r = 1, which implies no incentives to overbid.
B: Controls for firm characteristicsb
Size Log of the book value of pre-filing assets.
Profit margin Difference between the firm’s pre-filing operating margin (EBITDA/sales) and the industry
median operating margin.c
Tangible Fraction secured debt to total debt at filing, a proxy for the fraction of tangible assets.
C: Controls for auction demand
Piecemeal Binary indicator variable for the target firm being liquidated piecemeal
Concern Indicator for the firm being sold as a going concern (1− Piecemeal).
Industry distress Fraction of industry firms reporting an interest coverage ratio ICR < 1 or file for bankruptcy
the following year, where ICR=(EBITDA+interest income)/interest expense.c
Saleback Indicator that the firm is sold as a going concern to a target insider (owner and/or manager).
Multiple interest Indicator that more than one potential bidder express an interest in placing a bid.
Bank Indicator that the bankrupt firm’s bank finances the winning going concern bid.
aIf the auction excludes some liquid assets (such as cash balances, accounts receivables, or real estate), then la < l,
where l is the trustee’s estimate of the total piecemeal liquidation value of the bankrupt firm’s assets.
bPre-filing characteristics are from the last financial statement reported prior to filing.
cThe bankrupt firm’s industry consists of all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and that operate in the
same 4-digit SIC code as the bankrupt firm.
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Table 8
Overbidding tests assuming non-linear bidding functions
The table uses a Box-Cox transformation r(λ) of r defined as
r(λ) =
{
(rλ − 1)/λ for λ 6= 0
ln r for λ = 0.
Our estimate of λ is 1.53 with a p-value of 0.69. This estimate is indistinguishable from one (linearity) and from zero.
The table reports OLS coefficient estimates for the auction premium ln(p) with the overbidding variable r transformed
using λ = 1.53 (Panel A) and λ = 0 (Panel B and C). Sample of 124 firms auctioned in Swedish bankruptcy 1988-1991
with a liquidation recovery rate r < 1. Variable definitions are in Table 3. p-values and the degrees of freedom are
in parentheses.
Constant r(λ) Size Profit Tangible Adjusted F-value N
margin R2
A: Box-Cox transformation of r using λ = 1.53. Sample of going-concern auctions with r < 1
0.090 -1.478 0.031 0.426 -1.123 0.184 4.28 80
(0.950) (0.000) (0.738) (0.665) (0.013) (df=4) (0.004)
B: Box-Cox transformation of r using λ = 0. Sample of going-concern auctions with r < 1
-0.692 -0.346 0.093 -0.321 -1.310 0.146 4.24 76
(0.638) (0.001) (0.322) (0.747) (0.004) (df=4) (0.004)
C: Box-Cox transformation of r using λ = 0. Sample of piecemeal liquidations with r < 1
-0.620 -0.124 0.050 -0.103 -0.542 -0.076 0.22 44
(0.746) (0.741) (0.686) (0.842) (0.368) (df=4) (0.926)
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Table 9
Industry-adjusted post-bankruptcy operating performance and leverage
The table reports operating margins and debt ratios for firms auctioned as going concerns in bankruptcy, classified
by the level of the bank’s liquidation recovery rate r and whether the bankrupt firm’s bank finances the winning
bidder. ”Industry-adjusted” is the difference between the target firm’s value and the corresponding median value for
the target’s 4-digit SIC industry. ”Year 1” is the first calendar year after auction bankruptcy, etc. Superscript **
(*) indicates that the sample median is different from the industry median at the 1% (5%) level, using a Wilcoxon
signed ranks test. The p-value for the difference in industry-adjusted performance and debt medians is from a 2-sided
Mann-Whitney U-test. Variable definitions are in Table 3. Sample of 106 Swedish firms sold as going-concerns in
auction bankruptcy during 1988-1991.
Year after bankruptcy: 1 2 3 4
A: Industry-adjusted operating margin (EBDITA/sales)
rhigh = 1 Median -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 0.018
n 35 28 23 16
rlow = 1 Median -0.005 -0.017 0.004 0.018
n 24 21 14 13
Difference: rhigh vs. rlow 0.001 0.005 -0.015 0.000
(0.963) (0.840) (0.639) (0.930)
Bank = 1 Median -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 0.020
n 36 29 23 20
Bank = 0 Median 0.014 -0.018 -0.001 0.040
n 42 39 30 19
Difference: Bank = 1 vs. Bank = 0 -0.023 0.008 -0.007 -0.020
(0.183) (0.548) (0.693) (0.448)
rhigh = 1 and Bank = 1 Median -0.027 -0.034
∗ -0.032 0.019
n 16 11 9 5
rlow = 1 and Bank = 1 Median 0.100 0.062 0.008 0.022
n 7 6 4 5
Difference: rhigh vs. rlow | Bank = 1 -0.128 -0.096 -0.040 -0.003
(0.038) (0.016) (0.355) (0.754)
B: Industry-adjusted debt ratio (book value of debt/total assets)
rhigh = 1 Median 0.114
∗ 0.079∗ 0.004 0.026
n 27 23 19 13
rlow = 1 Median 0.121
∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.143 0.136∗∗
n 24 21 15 13
Difference: rhigh vs. rlow -0.010 0.010 -0.139 -0.110
(0.610) (0.934) (0.591) (0.144)
Bank = 1 Median 0.132∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.090 0.062
n 36 28 23 20
Bank = 0 Median 0.112∗ 0.073∗ 0.151 0.026
n 42 40 32 19
Difference: Bank = 1 vs. Bank = 0 0.020 0.027 -0.061 0.036
(0.568) (0.794) (0.621) (0.482)
rhigh = 1 and Bank = 1 Median 0.145
∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.097 0.083
n 16 11 9 5
rlow = 1 and Bank = 1 Median 0.089 0.052 0.012 0.068
n 7 6 4 5
Difference: rhigh vs. rlow | Bank = 1 0.056 0.088 0.085 0.014
(0.316) (0.191) (0.537) (0.754)
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